Mercer Law Review
Volume 56
Number 3 Lead Articles Edition

Article 8

5-2005

Perspectives on Judicial Selection
Norman L. Greene

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Judges Commons

Recommended Citation
Greene, Norman L. (2005) "Perspectives on Judicial Selection," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 56: No. 3, Article
8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol56/iss3/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Perspectives on Judicial Selection

by Norman L. Greene*
The Symposium entitled "Judicial Professionalism in a New Era of
Judicial Selection," held on October 22, 2004, at the Walter F. George
School of Law of Mercer University in Macon, Georgia, generated
important questions on judicial selection reform: how are judges
selected, how should they be selected, what makes a good judge, how
should we deal with a bad judge, what changes need to be made in
judicial selection, where are they being made, how can they be made in
other states, and how long will it take to accomplish them.1 Shall we
*

Copyright Norman L. Greene (2005). Member of the firm of Schoeman Updike &

Kaufman, LLP, New York, New York. Columbia College (A.B., 1970); New York University
School of Law (J.D., 1974).
The Author has written on various subjects involving the judiciary, including judicial
intemperance, conscience and the judiciary, and litigation. His work on the judiciary
includes published symposia, which he organized at the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, each of which is accompanied by his preface or introduction as noted, as
follows: Preface, Executioners, Jailers,Slavetrappers and the Law: What Role Should
Morality Play in Judging, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 863 (1997) (judges deciding against
conscience); Introduction, Politicianson Judges: FairCriticism or Intimidation, 72 N.Y.
U. L. REV. 294 (1997) (judicial independence); A Perspective on Temper in the Court: A
Forum on JudicialCivility, 23 FORD. URB. L.J. 709 (1996) (judicial intemperance); and A
Perspectiveon Nazis in the Courtroom,Lessons From the Conduct of Lawyers and Judges
Under the Laws of the Third Reich and Vichy, France, 61 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1122 (1996).
The Author gratefully acknowledges the support of Altria Group, Inc., in connection with
the research for and preparation of this Article.
1. Issues affecting the establishment of the judiciary were practical as well as
philosophical questions for the United States following the American Revolution and
remain practical for nations being built today, such as the former communist countries of
eastern Europe or Iraq. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Olga Shvetsova, Selecting
Selection Systems, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY

APPROACH 191 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman eds., 2002) (referring to debates
in Philadelphia in 1787 and in Moscow in 1993 to 1994). "Of all the difficult choices
confronting societies when they go about designing legal systems, among the most
controversial are those pertaining to judicial selection and retention: How ought a nation
select its judges and for how long ought those jurists serve?" Id.
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have a justice system where judgeships are a reward for the politically
faithful;2 where the right to dispense justice is acquired by unjustly3
heaping abuse on one's adversary through attack advertisements;
where selecting the best person for the job depends on skill in collecting
campaign cash; where many voters cast ballots blind, ignorant of the
candidate except for his name; and where unsuspecting voters choose a
"Roy Moore when they need a Harry Blackmun, who was not and never
would have been elected to any public office."4 These are all essential
questions to be resolved as Georgia and other states with elected
judiciaries decide how to reform their judicial selection systems.
This Article will highlight certain aspects of the dissatisfaction with
judicial selection expressed at the Symposium and suggest some
remedies. It will also focus on common objections to and proposed
solutions for appointive selection plans.5

2.

See, e.g., Robert J. McCarthy & Michael Beebe, Putting Politics First: Democratic

Boss Wields Big Power in Choice of Judges, BuFFALo NEWS, July 15, 2002, at Al
(describing the antics of former Erie County Democratic Committee boss G. Steven Pigeon):
Judges have control over their courtrooms, but G. Steven Pigeon has control over
how they get there. Pigeon, who rules the Erie County Democratic Committee,
has the final say on who runs for judge on his party's line and how they run ....
He tells them when to talk. He tells them when to shut up. He tells them to keep
the public out. He tells them to hire consultants. He hands them party debts to
pay. And he pressures them to make phone calls to keep him in power.
Id. Pigeon was subsequently replaced by another political leader, Erie County Democratic
Chairman Leonard R. Lenihan. James Tricoli, PassengerPigeons are Extinct, Speakupwny.com, at http://www.speakupwny.com/article_445.shtml (Sept. 22, 2003).
3. Because the public may too readily believe the advertisements of both candidates,
the image of the judiciary and the legal profession in general may suffer. The image of
both can ill-afford further damage.

4.

Patrick E. Longan, JudicialProfessionalismin a New Era of JudicialSelection, 56

MERCER L. REV. 913,922 (2005). Roy Moore, Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court,
was removed in connection with a controversy that included his defiance of a "federal court
order to remove a granite monument, known as Roy's Rock, [and which contained an
etching of the Ten Commandments], from the Alabama Judicial Building." Id. Former
United States Supreme Court Justice Harry Blackmun served on the Supreme Court from
1970 through 1994 and died in 1999.
5. These plans have been more commonly referred to as "merit selection." However,
the use of that phrase has been questioned because of the unnecessary suggestion that
elected judges lack merit. A more neutral term to use is "appointive selection." See, e.g.,
Ellen Mattleman Kaplan (Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts), Blueprint for the Future of
Judicial Selection Reform (1999), available at http://www.pmconline.org/blue/index.htm.
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THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Judges should decide cases impartially 6 and possess the requisite
professional abilities to enable them to do so.7 But circumstances today
make it appear that judges sometimes do not conduct themselves
impartially and commit themselves, in advance, to positions on legal
issues.' Some problems include judicial campaigns waged at excessive
costs with dangerously free campaign speeches and statements of
opinion that have expanded under the authority of Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White 9 and Weaver v. Bonner.10 In some campaigns,
candidates claim the right to characterize how they might decide
particular cases that come before them through misleading advertisements, signals, cues, and code words, even in voter guides. 1 "When an
advertisement attacks a judge on a legal issue, when an advertisement

6. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY 1, 9 (2003). "Judges occupy the role of umpires in an
adversarial system of justice; their credibility turns on their neutrality. To preserve their
neutrality, they must neither prejudge matters that come before them, nor harbor bias for
or against parties in those matters." Id.
Regardless of their personal opinions and views, however, it is axiomatic that judges
must adhere to the law. This presumes, of course, that the law is clearly discernible; if it
is not, the meaning of adherence to the law is more complex. See, e.g., id. at 7-8.
7. See id. at 10. "But independent judges may not be impartial judges who will uphold
the rule of law unless the pool from which their selection is made is carefully limited to
those who possess the necessary temperament, character, capabilities, and credentials."
Id.
8. No one assumes that judges have no opinions on major legal issues. Nor are the
restrictions on campaign speech merely devices to permit judges to conceal biases that
everyone knows that they may have. "My failure to express a particular view in a public
way on something doesn't necessar[ily] mean that I don't have a particular view." See John
Caher, Spargo Says Speech Limits on JudicialCandidates Deprive Voters of Information,
232 N.Y. L.J. 1, 7 (2004) (quoting Justice Thomas J. Spargo at symposium held at Albany
Law School in which the Author participated).
9. 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002).
10. 309 F.3d 1312, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2002).
11. STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS, 2004 JUDICIAL VOTER GUIDE, A GUIDE TO VOTING AND
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NORTH CAROLINA 1, 3 (2004), available at http://www.sboe.state.
nc.us/pdf/Judicial%20Voter%20Guide%202004%2OGenElect.pdf (on file with the Mercer
Law Review). Consider, for example, the statement of John Tyson who was seeking
election to the North Carolina Supreme Court: "He believes marriage is a sacred union of
a man and a woman and that all life is valuable and unique." Id. at 3. Can this be
anything other than an implication that he will vote in a particular way on gay marriages
and abortion rights issues?
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suggests a certain judge will produce a certain decision, the message to
the public is that judges are not expected to be impartial."12
Some claim judges are, or appear to be, pressured to decide cases in
popular ways or in ways favorable to their campaign contributors-as
opposed to on the basis of the law-to avoid retribution on election day
by the voters. This observation has been made for both civil cases,
where plaintiffs and defendants have sought to "retain and elect judges
perceived as favorably disposed toward them,"13 and criminal cases.' 4
Although some states are enacting or suggesting election reforms-public
financing of judicial elections (North Carolina); 6 screening committees
for judicial candidates (New York); 6 voters guides to inform the public
who the candidates are (North Carolina); 7 and volunteer committees

12. To Define ElectioneeringCommunications with Respect to Campaignsfor the Office
of Justice and Chief Justice of the Ohio Supreme Court: Hearingon S.B. 214 Before the
House Comm. on State Gov't, 105th General Assembly (Ohio 2004) (statement of Chief
Justice Thomas J. Moyer), at http://www.thenextsteps.org/documents/finaltesti
monyhouse_110404.doc.
13. Andrew Spalding & Carl Tobias, Civil Justice and Judicial Selection, reprinted in
JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 6, app. G, at 14. Ohio Chief Justice Thomas Moyer
testified before the American Bar Association's Commission on the 21st Century Judiciary
that whether or not it is true, the public suspects that contributions to judicial candidates
affect their decisions as judges. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 6, at 26. See generally
Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Court Politics:The PoliticalEconomy of Tort Awards,
42 J.L. & ECON. 157 (1999); Alexander Tabarrok & Eric Helland, The Effect of Electoral
Institutions on Tort Awards, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 341 (2002) (linking the elective
judiciary with higher awards in state tort cases).
14. The effect ofjudges' rulings in capital cases on their ability to remain judges or seek
higher office was explicitly recognized by Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens in
Harrisv. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 519-20 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) and throughout
the classic Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death,
DecidingBetween the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV.
759 (1995). See also Norman L. Greene et al., Rethinking the Death Penalty: Can We
Define Who Deserves Death?, 24 PACE L. REV. 107, 115 n.33 (2002) (collecting articles to the
same effect); Jeannine Bell, The Politics of Crime and the Threat to JudicialIndependence,
reprinted in JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 6, app. F. Professor Bell noted the reduction
of judicial involvement in capital cases as a result of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
but stated that the apparent or actual effect of elections on judicial decisions in the area
of criminal justice remains. JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note 6, at 1 & app. F. "[Tlhe
politics of crime [still] matter for state court judges, the vast majority of whom are elected."
Id.
15. Press Release, Justice at Stake Campaign, North Carolina Adopts Public Financing
for Supreme Court and Appellate Judicial Campaigns (Oct. 10, 2002), at http://faircourts.
org/files/NCsigning.pdf.
16. COMMISSION TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, REPORT TO
THE CHIEF JUDGE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 17-19 (June 2004).
17. 2004 JUDICIAL VOTER GUIDE, supra note 11.
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to address false advertising and other campaign conduct (Georgia), s
speakers at the Symposium repeatedly warned against over-optimism.
More than once we heard that judicial selection reform is a field of bunt
singles where progress is slow, rather than a field of home runs.
This refrain may have originated in certain times and places, but it
should not deter reformers from seeking needed reforms. Significant
reforms may result from a confluence of circumstances, including a
perceived need for reform and a will to achieve it through planning and
organization.' 9 In New York the acceptance of bribes by sitting trial
court judges recently spurred attention to reform, leading to the
2
incremental step of appointing a commission to reform elections. " In
the 1970s elections for New York's highest court led to the adoption of
a constitutional amendment changing the selection method for the New
York Court of Appeals from elective to appointive. 2 The unsatisfactory
nature of judicial elections has led to reform efforts not only in New
2
York, but also in other states, including West Virginia and Ohio."

18. Longan, supra note 4, at 933. These committees consist of panels of"high-profile,
highly credible individuals to monitor judicial elections." Id. The panels could seek to
dissuade candidates from using certain campaign tactics and respond to them through
press conferences, opinion-editorial pieces, and the like. Id. Voluntary bar association
groups may also play a similar role. Id. at 934. See generally GEORGIA COMMITTEE FOR
ETHICAL JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS, REPORT ON THE 2004 APPELLATE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS

(2004).
19. Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., Observations on the Wyoming Experience with Merit
Selection of Judges:A Model for Arkansas, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 281, 326 (1996).
20. Report of the Task Force on Judicial Selection of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Recommendations on the Selection of Judges and the Improvement of the
Judicial System in New York, 58 THE REC. 374, 375-76 (2003) (setting forth background
of recent New York reform efforts).
21. See DANIEL BECKER & MALIA REDDICK, JUDICIAL SELECTION REFORM: EXAMPLES
FROM SIX STATES, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY (2003), ch. 3, at 19, available at
http://www.ajs.org/js/jsreform.pdf. "This victory [in 19771 for merit selection in New York
followed a series of rancorous elections in the early 1970s." Id.
22. The West Virginia Bar is undertaking a study of judicial selection reform despite
the opposition of two sitting West Virginia Supreme Court Justices, Joseph Albright and
Larry Starcher. Editorial:Bar Should Study JudicialSelection, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL,
July 22, 2004, at 4A, available at http://www.restorebalancewv.org/News/NewsCoverage/Editorials2004lDailyMailJudgeStudy-072204.htm; Editorial:It's Time to Take a Fresh
Look at How We Select Judges, HERALD-DISPATCH, July 28, 2004, at A6, available at
http://www.restorebalancewv.orgNews/NewsCoverage/Editorials2004/HerDispatch.Judicial
Elect_07282004.htm. The appropriateness of two sitting justices attempting to tell a bar
committee what to study or what not to study-even allowing for the differences between
a voluntary and a mandatory bar-appears to be questionable. In New York, such a
statement would probably have no effect in deterring a bar committee from studying
whatever it intended to study.
23. See Hearingon S.B. 214 Before the House Comm. on State Gov't, supra note 12.
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Momentum toward political change has been driven by the efforts of the
organized bar, including the American Bar Association, the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, and various state bars; the Committee for Economic Development;2 4 and other organizations.25
26
Improving judicial selection is not just about getting better judges
but also about getting a better process. 7 Professor Patrick Longan's
article written for the Symposium, Judicial Professionalism in a New
Era of JudicialSelection, looks at the quality issue, focusing on despotic
behavior by judges. The Article states:
trial judges should be subject to some form of regular re-selection.
Their terms, or at least their first term, should not be so long that they
have too much time to rule as petty little despots, if that is what they
become ....

If the appointing authority will look to that pool [of trial

judges] when a seat comes open, then we can protect appellate judges
from hostile voters with greater confidence that we are not thereby
harboring a tyrant ... 2 For the few who will let the power of
judicial office go to their heads, some mechanism must be in place to
persuade them to behave out of fear of sanction or, as a last resort, to
punish them for abuse of their office . ...

.

Judges who soon become

The fear of
afflicted with "robe-itis" [may need to be removed] ....
being booted out might also inoculate some judges against the disease
of arrogance ....

"

24. See COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, JUSTICE FOR HIRE (2002), at
http://www.ced.org/docs/report/reportjudicial.pdf.
25. To catalogue all the national efforts at reform would be daunting; selective histories
of judicial selection reform efforts (both successful and unsuccessful) are shown on the web
site for the American Judicature Society, at http://www.ajs.org/js. The New York history
is located at http://www.ajs.org/js/NY history. For a more detailed account of New York's
successful effort to eliminate elections for its court of appeals, see BECKER & REDDICK,
supra note 21.
26. Determining which system-elections or appointments-provides the best judges
requires a philosophical discussion on what makes a good judge. This is beyond the scope
of this Article. Furthermore, attempting to debate the effectiveness of an elective system
by measuring the supposed merit of each elected judge (even where there is an agreement
on the definition of quality) misses the point-namely, which is the best system for
selecting judges. The quality of the elective judiciary, or of any given elected judge, does
not validate the deficiencies of the election system. Good judges can emerge from poor
selection systems. Even a monarch, dictator, or a political boss can be capable of selecting
a good judge from time to time, but that does not mean that we wish to have our judges
selected by such persons.
27. See, e.g., Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not to Elect: A Case Study of Judicial
Selection in New York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 834 (2004) ("Merit
selection . . . is a process issue.").
28. Longan, supra note 4, at 947.
29. Id. at 920.
30. Id. at 946-47.
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Some

misconduct may not even be reported, and therefore, will not generate
data, perhaps for fear of alienating a judge before whom one may
appear. Furthermore, as Professor Longan notes, even if it is reported,
31
a good deal of troubling conduct may not reach the disciplinary level.
But just as it is possible to overestimate the misconduct, it is also
possible to underestimate it. For example, Professor Longan's article
states that "[m]ost people who become judges will conduct themselves
with dignity and civility because they are the type of people who know

31. Id. at 945. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York sponsored an entire
program devoted to judicial intemperance that was published as a symposium. See
Norman L. Greene, A Perspective on Temper in the Court: A Forum on JudicialIncivility,
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709 (1996). Judicial incivility is merely another form of verbal
abuse and bullying, especially egregious since the recipient cannot respond in kind. Id. at
715. Such intimidation has nothing to do with the proper administration of justice, and
should draw the same public condemnation as such misconduct elsewhere, including the
schoolyard. In particular, judicial conduct commissions, court administrators, and bar
association groups with the power to remove, sanction, or negatively evaluate such judges
should respond promptly. Judicial intemperance is also in clear violation of the Code of
Judicial Responsibility, which "mandates temperance as part of a judge's job." Id. at 711.
The program on judicial incivility was also the subject of Daniel Wise, Lawyers Discuss
What To Do About Rudeness of Judges, 214 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (1995). In addition, New York
has developed aspirational rules of civility which are not intended to be enforced by rule
or sanction. They cover judges as well as lawyers, providing under "Judges' Duties to
Lawyers, Parties and Witnesses," the following: "I. A judge should be patient, courteous
and civil to lawyers, parties and witnesses .... B. Judges should not employ hostile,
demeaning or humiliating words in opinions or in written or oral communications with
lawyers, parties or witnesses." NEW YORK STATE UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, STANDARDS OF
CIVILITY (Oct. 1997).
For examples of judicial rudeness in the criminal litigation context, see Abbe Smith,
Defense-Oriented Judges, 32 HOFsTRA L. REV. 1483, 1486 (2004). ("Far too many judges
preside over cases with an imperiousness that suggests they ought to be called 'Your
Majesty' instead of 'Your Honor.' Far too many judges seem incapable of wisdom,
compassion, and fair-mindedness."). See also id. at 1488 ("Why do so many get 'black robe
disease?' This may partly be an occupational hazard. We clothe judges in ceremonial
robes, seat them above us, rise when they enter a room, and address them with honorifics.
It is hard for many judges to resist the corruption of vanity and self-importance.").
It is curious that judges such as a North Carolina judge whose verbal misconduct was
found to have "sullied the reputation of all judges" should have been left on the bench
rather than removed. See Emery P. Dalesio, NC Supreme Court Upholds Scolding of
2
Superior Court Judge, at http://www.journalnow.com/servlet/satellite?pagename=WSJ%
FMGArticle%2FWSJBasicArticle&C=MGArticle&cid=1031781385859&path=!localnews
The judge, "notorious for her coarse humor and questionable
&s=1037645509099.
remarks," was merely reprimanded by the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id. See also
In re Hill, 609 S.E.2d 221 (N.C. 2005). Allowing such a judge to continue under those
circumstances may only have a limited deterrent effect on her and others tempted to
commit the same offenses.
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what is appropriate."3 2 There is no statistical evidence of that, of
course, and none is offered. Indeed, it would be a peculiar study to seek
to determine how many judges do not misbehave or how many demonstrate good conduct. These and similar comments made elsewhere may
reflect merely anecdotal evidence or even a gesture of respect to the
judicial branch.
Some have wondered how the ill-tempered or otherwise ill-suited judge
can be controlled and whether that is best done in an elective or
appointive system.33 To begin with, control of such a judge need not
wait until the time for reselection. 4 The misconduct could either be
reported to the applicable judicial qualifications or conduct committee,
bar association committee, administrative judge, or Office of Court
Administration. However designated, the agency or entity handling such
complaints should develop rules for resolving them. In many cases a call
to a judge by the chief administrative judge informing such judge of the
complaint and seeking an explanation may be sufficient to resolve the
problem. A disciplinary system depends first on those who observe and
report judicial misconduct and then action by the authorities charged
with handling the problem. Indeed, there could be a formalized
procedure for evaluating judges before the time for reselection; the

32. Longan, supra note 4, at 920. A statement to the same effect appears in the
COMMISSION TO PROMOTE PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 16, at
6 (popularly known as the "Feerick Commission Report"). "We recognize that the
overwhelming majority of New York's elected judges are well qualified, hardworking
citizens dedicated to high ethical standards." Id. The web site address for the Feerick
Commission is http://law.fordham.edu/commission/judicialelections. Report of the Task
Force on Judicial Selection of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra
note 20, at 395 ("The Task Force emphasizes that New York's judiciary contains unusually
well-qualified judges, many of whom are among the nation's outstanding judges."). See also
John Caher, Experts Weigh Reform of Judicial Elections, 231 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (2005)
(reporting a contention by a New York State legislator sponsoring a hearing on judicial
selection reform that New York has "an incredibly good judiciary" chosen under the elective
process. The legislator is then quoted to blame judicial selection reform efforts for "having
done more to tarnish the image of judges than the scandals that precipitated the reform
movement."). Id.
33. Many judicial selection systems are actually mixed, such as when an initial
appointment is followed by a retention election. In wholly elective systems, judges are
sometimes first appointed to a vacancy on the bench before standing for election. James
J. Alfini & Jarrett Gable, The Role of the OrganizedBar in State JudicialSelection Reform:
The Year 2000 Standards, 106 DICK. L. REV. 683, 714-15 (2002).
34. To redress attorneys' fears of alienating judges before whom they must appear, the
law should be clear that judicial intimidation of a complainant against a judge should itself
form the basis for an additional grievance.
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Association of the Bar of the City of New York has recommended a pilot
project of mid-term evaluations.3 5
Without detailed public information on performance, the public is in
danger of electing and retaining abusive judges in an elective system or
appointive system with retention elections.3 6 If reselection is made by
a judicial nominating commission and not by election, such information
must be submitted to that commission as well. The North Carolina
voter guide, submitted at the Symposium, says nothing about the
candidate's temperament, and for all one is told, one could be electing
the next Texas federal judge, John McBryde.3 7 Nor does a candidate's
poor conduct on the bench generally become the subject of campaign
advertisements so as to otherwise reach the voting public. "When it
comes to . . . judicial candidates," a New York state judge noted with

rank and [,] serial
respect to New York judicial elections, "we get name[,]
3
dog."
his
with
him
of
photo
a
maybe
number, and
If there are to be elections of any sort for retention or otherwise, the
public should, to the extent reasonable and consistent with the need for
confidentiality, receive the type of data evaluated by bar association
committees who make the decision to recommend a judicial candidate as
35. Report of the Task Force on Judicial Selection of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, supra note 20, at 410.
36. In any event, under elective systems, incumbent judges sometimes have an
advantage over their challengers merely because of voter familiarity with their names.
Robert F. Utter, Selection andRetention-A Judge's Perspective, 48 WASH. L. REV. 839, 845
(1973). At the time of the article, Robert Utter was a justice of the Washington Supreme
Court.
37. 2004 JUDICIAL VOTER GUIDE, supra note 11.
38. Caher, supra note 8. New York is not unique in that respect. Consider the last
Illinois election in 2004. A Good Election for Bad Judges, CHIC. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2004, at 30
(commenting on the retention of all judges in Illinois up for retention in 2004):
And there were some very poor judges on that ballot. Judges who ducked the
legal organizations that try in good faith to evaluate the fitness of the people who
sit on the bench. Judges who are assigned to little corners of the court system
where they will do the least harm. Judges who fashion themselves as petty
dictators. Judges who have proven time and again that they don't know which is
The answer
the business end of a gavel and who don't belong on the bench ....
to this broken system of electing judges is to amend the Illinois Constitution to
allow for the appointment of judges by the governor and advisory panels.
A respected Illinois observer of the scene and scholar in the field of judicial selection
reform similarly noted:
Each judicial "election" simply confirms that Illinois has one of the worst systems
for choosing its judiciary-a political system that essentially "rigs" most initial
judicial elections for the favored few and a retention election system that freezes
into place for eternity (or so it seems) those bad initial choices.
E-mail from Allan Ashman to Norman Greene (Nov. 4, 2004) (on file with the Mercer Law
Review) (cited with permission of its writer).
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qualified or unqualified, presumably in a summarized form.39 If a
model is required, the information for the public could be of the nature
made public by Colorado about its own judicial candidates standing for
retention. Professor Longan describes Colorado's judicial performance
evaluations, which provide detailed information on incumbent judicial
candidates seeking retention based on carefully gathered data from
persons in a position to observe them.4 ° The decision to vote for a
candidate is far more critical than the decision of a bar association on a
judge's qualifications; the voters can elect or defeat a candidate. A bar
association's ratings may affect an election, but their effect is less direct
and sometimes nonexistent. There are sad examples of political leaders

39. The web site address for the Colorado judicial performance evaluations is
http://www.cojudicialperformance.com. Each evaluation includes a narrative profile with
the recommendation stated as "retain," "do not retain," or "no opinion." A review of
selected 2004 evaluations indicates that the vast majority in particular counties received
a recommendation of "retain," with a few receiving a rating of "no opinion." For general
background on performance evaluation commissions such as Colorado's, see Seth S.
Andersen, Judicial Retention Evaluation Programs, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1375 (2001),
available at http://Illr.lls.edu/volumes/v34-issue4/andersen.pdf.
Because it was unclear why the Colorado commission deemed so many judges acceptable,
on November 18, 2004, and, on December 15, 2004, I had a telephone interview with Jane
B. Howell, Colorado's Director of its Commission on Judicial Performance. The interviews
confirmed that in 2004, no judge received a "do not retain" rating. However, she said that
there are at least two reasons for this. First, Colorado uses a merit selection plan in the
first place, so presumably poorly qualified judicial aspirants are weeded out early and
never appointed. Second, self-selection is at work, with judges who privately learn of their
poor ratings deciding not to stand for retention so their adverse ratings never become
public. Ms. Howell noted that of 102 judges eligible for retention in 2004, 9 decided not
to stand for retention election and, therefore, were never evaluated. Ninety-three were
evaluated, and of those evaluated, only 83 stood for retention. It is uncertain, however,
which judges dropped out because of the ratings and which declined to seek retention
because of retirement or other reasons.
According to Ms. Howell, the judicial evaluations cost $2400 each and involve contact
with many in a position to assess the judge's performance. Telephone interview with Jane
B. Howell, Director, Colorado Commission on Judicial Performance (Nov. 18, 2004). The
Colorado commission's web site notes, among other things, the following:
The trial judges' evaluations result from survey questionnaires completed by
attorneys (including district attorneys and public defenders), jurors, litigants,
probation officers, social services case workers, crime victims, court personnel and
law enforcement officers. The evaluations also result from the following: relevant
docket and sentencing statistics; a personal interview with the judge; a selfevaluation completed by the judge, and information from other appropriate
sources, such as court observations.
Colorado Judicial Branch, Commissions on JudicialPerformance,at http://www.courts.state
.co.us/panda/judicialperformance/judperfindex.htm.
40. Longan, supra note 4, at 940.
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supporting candidates with unqualified ratings and voters electing
them.4' It is easier for voters or political leaders to dismiss a bar
association rating of a candidate when no detail is provided other than
the rating itself.
In the federal context, even detailed negative bar association rankings,
such as in the case of Judge Dora Irizarry, recently appointed to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, are
no guarantee that a candidate will be stopped. Judge Irizarry was the
subject of scathing criticisms by the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York and the American Bar Association for her alleged irascible
state court performance, including one alleged episode of throwing an
object at attorneys. The negative comments included statements that
Judge Irizarry was gratuitously rude and abrasive, and demeaned
lawyers; that she flew off the handle in a rage, for no apparent reason,
and screamed at attorneys; that she was impatient and did not fully
listen to attorneys' legal arguments; and finally, that she did not have
a good grasp of the legal issues presented to her." Nonetheless, she
obtained the unwavering support of New York's two Democratic Senators
and New York's Republican Governor and was confirmed by the United
States Senate.
II.

THE ALTERNATIVE

While some election reforms advance or at least are studied, a detailed
study of appointive systems is in order as well. Although there are other
models of judicial selection, including some in Europe involving a
professionally-trained judiciary, the principal United States appointive
selection model is based on the judicial nominating commission. Its
well-told history through the work of Professor Albert Kales, the
American Judicature Society, and the Missouri Plan need not be
repeated here.43 Likewise, that model deserves study to consider how,

41. Clifford J. Levy, Kevin Flynn, Leslie Eaton & Andy Newman, A Bronx Judiciary
Awash in Patronage,All Legal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2004, at Al (Two judges, "including the
judge responsible for overseeing all civil litigation, are former high-ranking Bronx
Democratic officials who were deemed unqualified to serve on the bench by the city bar
association when they first ran for election."). See also Daniel Wise, Elective System Is Put
Under Intense Review, 230 N.Y. L.J. 1, 1 (2003) ("the Nassau County Republican party
nominated two candidates for District Court seats even though the Nassau County Bar
Association had found them unqualified.").
42. Raymond Hernandez, PatakiChoice for Judgeship is Assailed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2,
2003, at B1.
43. Symposium, The American JudicatureSociety: Working to Improve the Adminstration of Justice Since 1913, 87 JUDICATURE 108, 110-111 (2003) (remarks of Dean James
Alfini of South Texas Law School). See generally ALLAN ASHMAN & JAMES J. ALFINI, THE
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if at all, it should be changed so as to increase public confidence in the
model, and then how to achieve political change to enact it. Proponents
of appointive systems should first create a good model of appointive
selection and then organize to advocate it. The importance of such
organization is noted below:
Those who are interested and dedicated to merit selection of judges
need to develop a plan. Merit selection did not come to Wyoming
without a fight. The proponents organized. The Judicial Selection and
Tenure Committee of the Wyoming State Bar actively promoted the
changes. They held well-publicized "Citizens' Conferences" where the
issues concerning judicial selection were discussed by local and
national authorities before widely represented audiences. Proponents
encouraged newspapers throughout the state to promote the conferences. At one of these conferences, organizers formed a geographically
and professionally diverse steering committee to directly promote merit
selection in the state. Moreover, organizers obtained funds from the
state bar, a state planning committee, the judicial conference, and
members of the state bar. It seems to me that if substantial reform is
to come to pass, an organized effort of this nature will be required."
Election proponents are reluctant to part people from their vote,
meaningless though the vote may be, and supporters of appointive
4
selection need to respond to the contentions of election proponents. "
They further need to avoid the self-defeating pessimism of some wouldbe reformers who note the following problems with the appointive
system: that appointive selection cannot be accomplished in our lifetime

KEY TO JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: THE NOMINATING PROCESS 10 (American Judicature
Society 1974).

44. Averill, supra note 19, at 326. See also Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial
Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43 (2003). "To gain traction with the public, judicial
selection must achieve the status of a movement ... [and capitalize] on bellwether events
that galvanize public opinion and give [the] movement focus and drive." Id. at 73-74. Cf
Roy A. Schotland, Summit on Improving Judicial Selection, Introduction: Personal View,
35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1361, 1367 (2001) (quoting former New Jersey Chief Justice Arthur
T. Vanderbilt's ubiquitous comment made decades ago in very different times that "judicial
reform is no sport for the short-winded") (footnote omitted).
45. See Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts, PartisanElections or Merit Selection?Myth
vs. Reality, at http://www.pmconline.orglindexjs.htm (proposed responses by supporter to
arguments of detractors of merit selection plans). A recent personal experience in my
voting district in New York City during the November 2004 election amply demonstrated
the meaninglessness of my vote. In my district nine judges were running for election, all
were cross-endorsed and had no opposition, and I was directed to vote for the nine
unopposed judges.
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(hardly an argument against reform or studying reform);4 that politics
will still remain in judicial selection (that the system is not perfect does
not mean it should not be refined and adopted);47 that it would be too
difficult to remove judges (it is already difficult in the elective system,
particularly because voters lack information on judicial performance);
and that one cannot overcome the skepticism that minority judges or
judicial aspirants will fare poorly in appointive systems (even though the
statistical evidence is equivocal, and minorities have fared poorly in
elective systems as well).4
Issues to be addressed include: how to insure that diversity is
achieved in an appointive system; 49 resolving how the judicial nominat-

46. See Charles G. Geyh, Rethinking Judicial Elections, BILL OF PARTICULARS 5, 9
(Spring 2003) (a magazine of the Indiana Univ. Alumni Ass'n) (The task may have seemed
daunting "in the 1940s, when civil rights lawyers gathered around tables to discuss a
strategy for overturning Plessy v. Ferguson and ending Jim Crow laws in their lifetime.").
See also Geyh, supra note 44, at 79. Whether such pessimists are reformers is a different
question. Some remind me of a colleague who asserted in various election cycles that
although he was a Democrat, he would be voting for the Republican candidate for
president. Because he seemed never to vote for the Democrat, the statement "I am a
Democrat" appeared to be no more than a device to persuade the listener that he should
vote Republican since even "Democrats," such as the speaker, were doing so.
47. Excellent responses to common attacks on proposals for appointive systems appear
in Lawrence H. Averill, Jr., The ContinuingCase for Merit Selection of Judges in Arkansas,
30 ARK. LAW. 1 (Spring 1996). These include how to respond when judges state that they
would not be able to become judges under an appointive system. Such judges imply not
that they are incompetent but rather that such systems have "unwritten criteria which
excludes a vast number of lawyers from consideration." Id. Professor Averill states that
he has detected no evidence of such unwritten criteria; he believes a well-designed
appointive system should rest on fair and articulated criteria, which should provide ample
opportunity for the qualified to be appointed. As for which systems a sitting judge would
prefer, one attorney told me based on anecdotal evidence that a judge typically supports
the particular system that made him a judge, regardless of whether it is elective or
appointive. Of course, some evidence goes the other way, including former Texas Chief
Justice Thomas R. Phillips and others who were elected but support an appointed judiciary.
See The Honorable Thomas R. Phillips, Keynote Address: Electoral Accountability and
JudicialIndependence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 137, 138 (2003) (quoted infra text accompanying
note 72).
48. See, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 27, at 816 (outside New York City, "the data plainly
reveals an astonishing lack of minority presence on the bench."). See also John Caher,
Model for Selecting Top Court Judges Reveals Its Flaws, 230 N.Y. L.J. 1 (2003) ("'The
elected judiciary outside of New York City is so lily white it is frightening,' said Mr.
Zeidman" [Professor Steven Zeidman, CUNY Law School, former Executive Director, Fund
and Committee for Modern Courts]. "It is appalling. That is what our elective system is
producing. That, if nothing else, should give people pause to reconsider how we select
judges.").
49. See generally Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on
State and Federal Appellate Benches, 1985 and 1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84, 84-92 (2001);
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ing commissioners are to conduct themselves through establishment of
a code of conduct; striking a balance between the need for confidentiality
and the openness of the process; and creating oversight or review over
the commission's work so that one can determine whether there has been
compliance with the code and mandate of the commission. The model
must be designed to encourage the capable to apply and ward off the
tampering politician who might control it in such a manner as to deter
anyone-no matter how qualified-but the well-connected from applying.
Without sufficient applications, the appointive system might be unable
to attract the best available candidates.5 0
Constructive solutions exist. The response to the suggestion that the
judicial nominating commission is a creature of the appointing authority
is to create a commission independent of the appointing authority. The
appointing authority should have no control over selecting commissioners on the judicial nominating commission. If that is not politically
feasible, the appointing authority should have as little control as

Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Explaining Judicial Diversity: The Differential
Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats on State Supreme and Appellate Courts,
3 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 329, 329-52 (Winter 2003). Cf. Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on
the Bench: Beyond Role Models and Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000);
Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judgingthe Judges: RacialDiversity, Impartialityand Representationin
State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REV. 95 (1997).
50. See Caher, supra note 48 (commenting on appointive selection for the New York
Court of Appeals, including the drying up of applications). Because of a lack of applications
to the New York Court of Appeals Judicial Nominating Commission, the then President of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York pleaded for more applications. See E.
Leo Milonas, Hey, You Never Know!, Association of the Bar of the City of New York 44th
Street Notes, June 2003 ("many qualified candidates are reluctant to put themselves
forward for consideration by the Commission [the Judicial Nomination Commission for the
New York Court of Appeals]. Indeed, for the last two vacancies, the Commission had to
extend the filing date for applicants because of the small number who had applied."). At
the time of the article, Mr. Milonas was also a member of the Judicial Nomination
Commission for the New York Court of Appeals. See also Judith L. Maute, Selecting
Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Backroom?, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1238
(2000):
In some states, lawyers may perceive the appointment process as "wired" and do
not apply unless they have friends in high places who will spend the political
capital lobbying behind the scenes on their behalf. Their reticence is understandable, especially when they or those they know have invested considerable effort
in applying, they appear "qualified" according to the stated criteria, but they have
not been seriously considered or given the opportunity for a personal interview.
See also Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures,and Issues, 49 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 51 (1994) (referring to "panel-wiring," where the governor makes his
preferences known to one or more commissioners, and the commission names a panel
containing the name of the attorney preferred by the governor plus two others "chosen on
a 'what difference does it make' basis").
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possible. The role of the appointing authority should be limited, as
much as possible, to selecting from the candidates proposed by the
commission. 1 If the appointing authority controls enough commissioners, he may be able to control the output of the commission, and
therefore, help ensure that he is "fed back his political choices" from
whom he will select. This may also give the impression, accurate or not,
that the system is "wired" in favor of nominees connected to the
appointing authority, and thus, will deter qualified applicants from
applying to the commission for consideration for judgeships.5 2
In a classic book published by the American Judicature Society, the
purpose of excluding the appointing authority from making selections to
the judicial nominating commission is explained as follows:
Since merit selection is intended to deprive the executive of the
opportunity to make judicial appointments solely on the basis of his
political motivations (and to remove the political pressures on him to
do so), it is thought to be self-defeating to permit the executive to have
a direct say in the appointment of the nominating commissioners.53

Otherwise stated:
[i]f the commission were to become dominated by the "governor's
people," the chances would be greater that a governor's previously
band-picked candidate might become one of the nominees of the
commission, and, in effect, be assured of ultimate appointment.
Inevitably, the duty of the commission to decide independently upon a
slate of nominees would be destroyed and the system would degenerate
into one founded on political "reward" rather than merit.54

51. Some have questioned whether, and if so, how often, the appointing authority may
reject the list offered to him and request a new list of more names. This issue is beyond
the scope of this Article. However, were the appointing authority given the unfettered
power to reject lists, that would undermine the purpose of the commission-based appointive
selection plan and be inconsistent with the view that the appointing authority's role is
limited to choosing from the selections offered to him.
52. At the Symposium some skepticism was expressed over creating a functioning
nonpolitical judicial nominating commission. To paraphrase or quote a panelist, one cannot
"take the politics out of politics." But such clever phrases serve only as flippant dismissals
of the possibility of serious reform. In that sense they are reminiscent of the repeated
defeatist refrain that one might never see appointive selection reform in one's lifetime.
Furthermore, such phrases unreasonably attempt to equate judicial selection systems that
are unlike and incorrectly assume that all appointive systems are the same.
53. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 43, at 25. See Report of the Task Force on Judicial
Selection of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 20, at 400 ("The
appointing authority must not dominate the screening committee or have sufficient control
of the committee such that his or her nominees are always approved.").
54. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 43, at 71.
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The Association of the Bar of the City of New York has noted that to
avoid cynicism about judicial selection, the appointing authority should
avoid appointing only those known to be close to him, even if they are
qualified. 5
In addition there should be safeguards, in the form of anticommunication rules, against the appointing authority influencing the judicial
nominating commission.

A code of conduct

56

should be in place for

judicial nominating commissioners mandating that they report to the
chair of the judicial nominating commission any attempt by the
appointing authority to influence the commission and mandating that
the chair make the attempt public. To deter the appointing authority
from trying to influence the commission, since he cannot be fined,
imprisoned, or dismissed, the appointing authority should lose his pick
for that particular opening, with the selection going to the chief judge of
the state or some other equally respected person or entity.57 The
alternative of disqualifying the judicial candidate who is the intended
beneficiary of the influence is unacceptable; such a candidate is
presumably innocent of the attempted influence and may be wellqualified. Furthermore, the influence may be designed to create a false
positive so as to eliminate a candidate who may be well qualified. If the
commissioner was actively involved in the prohibited communication, or
if he failed to disclose it, he should be dismissed from the commission."

55. The Task Force on Judicial Selection of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, supra note 20, at 400.
56. Although not incorporating this precise rule, there are codes of conduct for judicial
nominating commissioners. One of the more elaborate codes is in effect in Massachusetts.
Exec. Order 445 (No. 03-03) (2003), Order Reconstituting the Judicial Nominating
Commission and Establishing a Code of Conduct for Commission Members and Nominees
to Judicial Office (superceded by Exec. Order No. 458).
57. Having a selection made by an atypical appointing authority should not result in
inferior selections because the alternative appointing authority would be selecting from the
same group of persons as the original appointing authority.
58. See generally Alfini & Gable, supra note 33, at 713. "At all times in the selection
process, however, nominating commissions and commissioners should avoid 'lobbying'
appointing authorities in favor of particular judicial candidates. Many states require
individual commissioners to disclose to the full commission any communication either with
the appointing authority or as to private communication with judicial candidates." Id. "A
Judicial Nominating Commission should maintain its independence from all inappropriate
influences, particularly from the appointing authority, and should operate in a manner that
instills public confidence and encourages applicants from a broad range of personal and
professional backgrounds." Id. at 710. This article includes an Appendix consisting of
Standards on State Judicial Selection, Report of the ABA Standing Committee on Judicial
Independence, Cbmmission on State Judicial Selection Standards. Id. at 696.
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Judicial nominating commissions should operate openly to the extent
possible. However, they must balance the public's need for information
regarding candidates with the candidates' need for personal privacy."
An open process is important to ensure that "potential applicants and
the public at large feel that the process is accessible and to counter any
perception of elitism (as opposed to meritocracy, which is to be encouraged). ' 60 Even if some matters remain confidential, however, the public
should respect the process so long as the need for confidentiality is
justifiable.6 1 Nationally, judicial nominating commission models vary
in terms of what is confidential and what is not; and each state would
need to determine the extent of confidentiality that is consistent with its
own political culture.6 2 Secrecy in the context of judicial selection by
appointment for the New York Court of Appeals has been criticized in
particular:
It is impossible to judge whether the seven candidates [reported out for
the New York Court of Appeals] that survive commission scrutiny are
the seven best, since the process is secret. The public is not told who
applied, how many applied, who was interviewed, how many were
interviewed, how the various members of the commission voted or how
many votes any particular nominee received."
A process where the public is entirely excluded [i.e., the New York
Court of Appeals plan], is kept in the dark as to how and why a certain
candidate emerges for consideration, knows next to nothing about the
nominee's qualifications and is generally denied any meaningful
opportunity to comment about a designee . ...

.

The degree to which there may be openness, of course, may be the
subject of dispute. Although there have been other proposals for

59. Id. at 712.
60. The Task Force on Judicial Selection of the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, supra note 20, at 402.
61. ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 43, at 57. The authors also note that "the public
gene4'ally is suspicious of important governmental processes which appear to be cloaked in
secrecy." Id. See also The Task Force on Judicial Selection of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, supra note 20, at 411 ("Although its deliberations will be private,
the screening committee must operate in as open a manner as possible.").
62. The web site for the American Judicature Society contains a chart indicating the
rules of confidentiality in effect for various appointive selection plans in the states. See at
http://www.ajs.org/js/JudicialMeritCharts.pdf.
63. Caher, supra note 48, at 2 (writing on secretive nature of New York Court of
Appeals appointive selection).
64. John Caher, Fine Results, But A FlawedProcess, 3 GOV'T L. & POL'Y J. 25, 25 (Fall
2001) (writing on New York Court of Appeals).
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increased openness, there must be some privacy to permit frank
deliberations among the judicial nomination commissioners and to
65
safeguard the legitimate expectations of applicants for privacy.
Proposals for more openness in the process include the following:
Part 3, Section 10. Open meetings.
(a) All organizational meetings of the judicial nominating commission
shall be open to the public. A notice outlining the topics to be
discussed should be given to the public 72 hours prior to the meeting
....

(b) All final deliberations of the judicial nominating commission

shall be secret and confidential. (c) The confidentiality of other
proceedings of the judicial nominating commission shall be determined
by commission rule.
Commentary: Commission proceedings should be as open as possible.
Commissions might want to consider, for example, holding open
interviews or releasing the names of all applicants, both of which are
done in some jurisdictions. The final deliberations and selection of
nominees should remain confidential to encourage free and open
discussion of the candidates' qualifications .... 66

65. Certainly the openness of judicial selection should not be such as to discourage
applications for judgeships. See ASHMAN & ALFINI, supra note 43, at 56-57 (there should
be a "selection process which will 'operate with sufficient dignity, so as not to cause capable
lawyers to refuse to be candidates for judicial office.'"). Among other things, one should
consider the potential negative effect of an attorney's application for a judgeship upon his
current employment should that application become known.
66. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS 19 (1994).
Judith L. Maute also recommends more openness in appointive selection, as follows:
I propose that states adopt an open meeting and public hearing component for
judicial nominating commissions. To the extent that the public (either in person,
or through the media) has an opportunity to attend and be heard at some time
before names are submitted to the appointing authority, there will be greater
confidence that the selection process was open, and considered a wide range of
input. Clouds of suspicion about backroom political deals can be dissipated with
the light of day. This is not to suggest that all meetings of the nominating
commission should be open to the public. Closed meetings are appropriate for
individual interviews with candidates. Final deliberations, may also be conducted
which may require sensitive and frank discussions of candidates' qualifications
and past conduct in private.
Maute, supra note 50, at 1237. An influential New York report written by its Commission
on Government Integrity, chaired by then Fordham Law School Dean, John Feerick,
suggested a limited relaxation of confidentiality, partly to ensure diversity in judicial
selection and partly in the interest of overall fairness, stating:
[Slome public scrutiny of the work of the nominating commission is essential to
help insure that it operates fairly. We realize that the identities of applicants, the
data collected concerning them, and their evaluation by the commission must
remain confidential in order to encourage well-qualified candidates to apply and
to protect their privacy. But the nominating commission should be required to
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The goal of achieving a diverse judiciary6 7 has frequently been
recognized, both in terms of the make-up of judicial nominating
commissions and the judiciary itself: "In a democratic society it is
important that public bodies such as judicial nominating commissions be
broadly representative of the communities they serve. Care should be
taken to ensure that the composition of the commission
be reflective of
68
the demographic makeup of the state or district."
[D]iversity benefits the judiciary both by enhancing perspectives that
bear on governance and by giving people of differing backgrounds a
sense of assurance that persons with similar life experiences are in
positions of authority ...appointing authorities might wish to appoint
women and minority judges in greater numbers; and that diversity in
judicial appointments should remain a continuing goal.69
The New York State Bar Association's report by Action Unit No. 4
dated May 14, 1993 (the "NYSBA plan"), not only recommends appointive selection but also includes a feature to help ensure greater diversity.7" The NYSBA plan provides for
a bipartisan review commission to oversee and collect data on the
effectiveness of the new [judicial selection] system generally, and in
improving judicial diversity, in particular. The review commission

maintain and disclose statistical information on, for example, the numbers of
applicants, the numbers and percentages of minority group and female applicants,
and the numbers and percentages of minority group and female applicants who
are nominated and appointed. Not compiling or disclosing such statistical
information serves no useful purpose and can only undermine public confidence
in the appointive process.
Becoming A Judge: Report On The Failings Of Judicial Elections In New York State,
reprinted in GOVERNMENT ETHICS REFORM FOR THE 1990's 298-99 (John Feerick & Bruce
Green eds., 1991).
67. The American Bar Association has recognized that the problem of obtaining
diversity is not merely one of selecting a diverse judiciary, but rather of increasing the pool
of minority lawyers from which a diverse judiciary may be selected; and increasing that
pool may require positive action to achieve diversity. See JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY, supra note
6, at 63 (legal professionals should encourage minorities to complete college and attend law
schools, including through visits to high schools and youth centers). "Diversity efforts
within the bench and bar can only be so successful without a qualified pool of diverse law
school graduates." Id. at 62. Furthermore, even with an increased pool of minority
lawyers, their interest in becoming a judge as opposed to a different legal career is not
assured.
68. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS 16 (1994).
69. Maute, supra note 50, at 1240 (footnote omitted).
70. ACTION UNIT No. 4, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS'N, A MODEL PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE
N.Y. ST. BAR ASS'N'S PRINCIPLES FOR SELECTING JUDGES (May 14, 1993).
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would collect and annually publish statistics on the composition of the
nominating commissions and the judiciary and report its findings to
the Governor, the Legislature and the public within five years of
implementation of the new system. The dissemination of this
information would allow the public to evaluate the performance of
elected officials in their appointments to the commission and in their
selection of judicial candidates.7 1
However, the NYSBA plan provides virtually no enforcement action, and
the report is only required within five years. These issues should be
addressed if the proposal is adopted.
In addition an appointive selection plan should consider creating a
review commission or entity in order to review the functioning of the
judicial nominating commission. Such a review function could be
established within the Office of Court Administration, or it could be
exercised by a free-standing agency or person. The review entity would
be charged with reviewing the operations of the judicial nominating
commission and dealing with violations of the code of conduct by judicial
nominating commissioners. The review entity should also have full
access to the records of the judicial nominating commission. Such a
review entity should ensure that the commission operates fairly and in
accordance with its constitutional or statutory mandate.
III.

CONCLUSION

As former Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas R. Phillips
wrote, the elective system for selecting our judiciary fails us badly:
[Miodern judicial elections have been manipulated and abused in ways
that diminish respect for the rule of law. Each election cycle,
additional states experience divisive, expensive, agenda-driven campaigns, increasingly accompanied by independent expenditures from
national interest groups. The problem is now national in scope, and it
demands national attention. If we do nothing, we risk not just an
erosion, but indeed a meltdown in respect for the courts and the rule
of law. 2
The stakes in the struggle to reform the American judiciary and the
way in which it is selected are high. Litigants at the wrong end of an
unjust ruling may never recoup their financial losses.
Criminal
defendants imprisoned when justice fails will never get back the time
they served. Only the complacent may suggest that nothing can be done
to resolve the problem of judicial selection in the United States. The

71. Id. at 17.
72. Phillips, supra note 47, at 142.
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rest of us can ensure that only the best methods are used to select those
with whom we have entrusted with judicial power, and we can be
haunted by the words of the late Yale Law School Professor Robert M.
Cover, who stated:
Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and death. This is
true in several senses. Legal interpretive acts signal and occasion the
imposition of violence upon others: Ajudge articulates her understandsomebody loses his freedom, his property,
ing of a text, and as a result,
73
his children, even his life.
The Mercer Law Review and the Georgia Court Futures Committee
deserve credit for sponsoring this important Symposium in an effort to
advance the debate and achieve meaningful judicial selection reform.

73. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986) (footnote
omitted).

